Abstract: According to empirical evidence, extrinsic incentives often crowd out intrinsic motivation, thus reducing the effort choices of workers. This article presents a simple model illustrating how the introduction of monetary incentives causes a discontinuous reduction in worker effort as well as a reduction in worker motivation to act in the interest of a principal. The primary finding is that motivation crowding out occurs when then the object of an agent's intrinsic motivation is a principal who is also the source of the extrinsic compensation the agent receives. When intrinsic satisfaction is directed at more generalized social norms of behavior, however, extrinsic rewards will not crowd out intrinsic motivation.
In spite of the growing empirical evidence that monetary incentives often crowd out intrinsic motivation and thus induce lower levels of effort, economists have been unable to provide convincing economic explanations for motivation crowding out (Kreps, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001 ). For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) considered two possible explanations for their experimental findings. The first explanation was that agents are motivated by extrinsic and intrinsic factors and that the introduction of monetary compensation "crowds out" intrinsic motivation. Although they accepted that some form of "crowding out" seemed to occur, Gneezy and Rustichini rejected this explanation because it does not explain the discontinuous reduction in performance they observed when incentives are introduced. The second explanation was that performance contracts are incomplete and the introduction of incentives causes agents to change their perception of the contracts. Specifically, without explicit incentives, agents perceive the contracts as embodying an implicit obligation on their part to provide some "basic" level of effort, which obligation is based on social norms of cooperation or reciprocity (see Fehr and Gächter, 2000b) . Although such social norms may exist (see Ostrom, 2000) in support of intrinsic incentives that induce agents to supply effort when contracts are incomplete and explicit incentives are absent, this does not explain why the introduction of incentives changes the perceived obligation of workers to supply effort.
This paper presents a model illustrating how the combination of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations explains the discontinuous shift in worker effort when incentives are introduced. This paper also answers the question of why the introduction of incentives produces a reduction in performance by crowding out intrinsic motivation. To say that extrinsic incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation suggests that when extrinsic incentives are introduced into a utility function comprising both extrinsic as well as intrinsic components, the agent behaves as if the intrinsic features of his utility are no longer salient. What conditions must exist to make an agent behave as if the intrinsic features of his utility are no longer important when extrinsic incentives are introduced? This paper answers this important question. Unlike previous models that illustrate motivational crowding out by making assumptions about the signs of partial derivatives (as in Frey, 1993 and Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) , this paper shows that the crowding out of intrinsic motivation is an optimal response of the agent to the introduction of incentives when intrinsic motivation is directed at the interests of the principal (e.g., when the agent is motivated by loyalty to the principal) because of the offsetting effects agent and principal interests have in an agent's utility comprising both extrinsic and intrinsic features. Thus, when an agent derives intrinsic satisfaction from working in the interest of a principal, and this principal also controls the agent's compensation, then extrinsic incentives can be shown to crowd out intrinsic motivation under certain conditions. The reason is that the combination of fixed and incentive compensation creates a latent "conflict of interest" between the agent's extrinsic interests and his intrinsic interests if the latter are tied to the well-being of the principal. However, when intrinsic motivation is tied to more generalized norms of behavior (e.g., to provide an honest day's work for an honest day's pay) rather than to principal interests, then compensation does not crowd out intrinsic motivation. In this sense this paper supplements Murdock's (2002) article that shows how incentive contracts in a principal-agent framework optimally respond to the presence of agent intrinsic motivation. In his paper, intrinsic motivation complements an implicit contract between a firm and worker, in that the firm agrees to implement projects generating positive intrinsic utility for the agent but negative expected returns for the firm. The firm gains in the long run, however, because the intrinsic motivation of the worker increases the effect of effort incentives attached to other projects that are profitable, thus increasing the overall returns of the firm. In contrast, this paper shows that under certain circumstances the use of extrinsic effort incentives could backfire by reducing the effort choices of agents engaged in activities generating positive profits for the firm.
II. Model
Suppose a principal hires an agent to supply effort, e, in exchange for compensation, w. If p is the revenue generated per unit of effort, then the principal's profits are w pe − . If the disutility of effort for the worker is 2 e , then the agent's extrinsic utility is 2 e w − . Optimally, the worker should provide effort 2 / * p e = , which maximizes social welfare (profits plus utility).
A. Explicit Incentives and the Discontinuous Reduction of Effort
How do we account for evidence that the introduction of incentives reduces the effort choice of the agent? To answer this question, suppose the agent chooses effort, e, to maximize the following utility function comprising both extrinsic and intrinsic elements:
The Murdock, 2002) . The parameter / could also be interpreted as the degree to which the agent feels an innate sense of duty (such as loyalty) toward the principal. Consistent with Kant (1949) , who likened the honoring of one's duty to an "inner satisfaction" and a "genuine incentive," the ideas of honoring a perceived duty and being intrinsically motivated may be used synonymously. Thus, the stronger is the agent's innate sense of duty toward the principal, the greater is the intrinsic motivation of the agent to provide the required effort. Assume r p > and 0 ≥ δ (so that the agent is motivated to be productive rather than destructive). In this model, to say that intrinsic motivation is crowded out means that the agent behaves as if 0 = δ . An agent who is intrinsically motivated, on the other hand, behaves as
For simplicity, assume a two-period framework. In period one a principal offers an employment contract to an agent randomly drawn from a population consisting of workers whose reservation wage is zero and who are identical in their abilities, but are different in the size of / defining the strength of the intrinsic motivation they feel, so that agents with higher /s are more intrinsically motivated than agents with lower /s, other things being equal. Assume further that the level of / is private information and not knowable to the principal at any cost.
Therefore, we are abstracting away from the principal's problem of identifying agents with high /s. The contract offered to the agent consists of a fixed wage, w , and an incentive rate, 0 ≥ r , in exchange for effort, e, which the agent selects. If the agent agrees to the contract, then in period two the agent makes the effort choice and the principal compensates the worker, which occur simultaneously. In choosing effort, the agent can choose whether or not to be intrinsically motivated but does not choose the actual value of δ . Again, an intrinsically motivated agent is one who chooses effort as if 0 > δ in his utility, while an agent whose intrinsic motivation has been crowded out chooses effort as if 0 = δ .
Given equation (1) Note that in this second case, effort increases as the piece rate increases (the optimal effortincentive profile is positive). These two contractual scenarios conform to the stylized fact that workers are often intrinsically motivated when no incentive compensation is offered (i.e., 0 = r and 0 > δ ) but are not intrinsically motivated when incentives are offered (i.e., 0 > r and 0 = δ ). Equation (2b) summarizes the effort choice of the agent under each of these two
According to the experimental evidence, effort supplied under a fixed-fee and positive "duty" contract will often equal or exceed effort supplied under the incentive contract (i.e., 2 1ê e ≥ ). This would be true when p r / ≥ δ , or when the intrinsic motivation or sense of duty of the agent is sufficiently "strong." In other words, when p r / ≥ δ , then effort provided by the agent when no extrinsic incentives are offered ( 1 e ) will not be less than effort provided by the agent when incentives are offered and the agent's sense of intrinsic motivation is zero ( 2 e ). If incentives are subsequently introduced, however, then the effort choice of the agent discontinuously declines from 1 e to 2 e , if the introduction of incentives also results in the agent behaving as if 0 = δ . Thereafter, any increase in piece rates results in increased effort (i.e., as r increases, 2 e increases continuously). This is illustrated in Figure 1 .
B. Motivation Crowding Out When Duty is Directed Toward a Principal
Why is the introduction of a piece rate associated with an apparent disappearance of a sense of duty by the worker? That is, why does 0 > r cause the agent to behave as if
This question is especially germane when one recognizes that the agent's utility is increasing in /. Thus, wouldn't the agent prefer that 0 > δ when 0 > r ? Gneezy and Rustichini speculated that the change from a fixed-fee to an incentive contract is associated with a change in the agent's perception of the contract because the contract is incomplete. The agent's "perception," in effect, fills in the missing parts (e.g., how much effort to supply). When incentives are not offered, the agent's belief that "effort should be given when one is paid" -which might be derived from norms of reciprocity or other sources -may help the agent determine how much effort to supply; hence, the agent supplies effort 1 e . In the case of an incentive contract, however, the perception might be that effort should be rewarded according to the piece rate only. In this case, social norms for effort are not required because the level of the piece rate helps the agent determine how much effort to supply; hence, the agent supplies effort 2 e . Although perceptions may help explain how the agent chooses effort in the absence of incentives, it is not obvious why social norms of reciprocity and the associated feelings of obligation should suddenly disappear when perceptions shift following the introduction of incentives. Why doesn't the worker select effort according to the incentive rate as well as the social norm for work, since fulfilling a duty is intrinsically rewarding to the agent (i.e., it adds to the agent's utility)? Why does the incentive "crowd out" the agent's innate sense of duty rather than reinforce it?
In order to understand why compensation might diminish the agent's intrinsic motivation to adhere to a perceived duty -that is, why an agent with utility comprising extrinsic and intrinsic elements would choose effort as if intrinsic utility no longer mattered just because incentives are offered -we must examine the utility of the agent when 0 = δ (no intrinsic motivation) and 0 > δ (positive intrinsic motivation) under the two cases of 0 = r (no incentive compensation) and 0 > r (positive incentive compensation). This is done by evaluating the utility of the agent from equation (1) 
which corresponds to an effort choice of 0 = e . If, however, the agent derives positive satisfaction by fulfilling a perceived duty to act in the principal's interest, so that 0 > δ , then the utility of the agent is
which corresponds to an effort choice by the agent of 1 e ) 2 / ( p δ =
. The agent will behave in a manner reflecting intrinsic motivation when equation (3b) is not less than (3a), or when
Equation (4) 
Equation (7) says that if the fixed compensation offered by the principal is "too high," then some agents intrinsically motivated to provide effort in the absence of incentive compensation (i.e., The reason the fixed fee plays such an important role in determining whether incentive compensation drives out intrinsic motivation is because both forms of compensation (fixed and incentive pay) have opposing effects on the extrinsic and intrinsic portions of the agent's utility.
Unlike effort, which increases the agent's extrinsic utility 2 e re w − + (but at a decreasing rate) as well as the agent's intrinsic utility ) ( re w pe − − δ (since r p > by assumption), increases in both the fixed wage, w , and the incentive rate, r, increase extrinsic utility but decrease intrinsic utility. This is because the agent recognizes that higher compensation reduces the overall level of profits that accrue to the principal, other things being equal, and it is the overall level of profits that the agent -by assumption -feels a duty to support. When the fixed compensation is too high and incentive rates are offered, the agent must balance the diminished importance of satisfaction derived from fulfilling a duty to the principal with the increased rewards extrinsic compensation provides (e.g., "if the principal's profit is not going to be very large, what's the point of my worrying about it?"). In other words, a fixed compensation that is too large combined with the presence of an incentive rate literally forces the agent to choose between his extrinsic interests and his intrinsic interests he feels for the principal. Only when the innate sense of satisfaction that the agent derives from acting in the principal's interest is large enough (i.e., IC δ δ ≥ and FW δ δ ≥ ), which we would expect for some workers, will the intrinsic satisfaction from acting in the principal's interest be strong enough to outweigh the temptation to ignore his duty to the principal.
C. Intrinsic Motivation When Duty is Directed Toward a Social Norm
In the preceding model it was assumed that the agent derived satisfaction from acting in the interest of the principal, where the principal was assumed to have an interest in maximizing profits of re w pe − − . Now suppose that rather than feeling a duty toward the principal, the agent felt an obligation to adhere to a generalized social norm, such as "provide an honest day's work for an honest day's pay" or "honor your contractual obligations." This could be interpreted to mean that the agent believes he should provide at least some minimal level of effort, e , when employed by the principal. Thus, instead of an objective function defined by equation (1) 
In this case the object of the agent's intrinsic motivation is not the profits of the principal per se, although providing higher levels of effort could increase the principal's profits. Rather, the object of the agent's duty is providing effort at least equal to some minimum, e , so that the intrinsic utility of the agent is ) ( e e − δ . In this formulation the utility of the agent is increased when e e > and decreased when e e < , thus giving the agent an incentive to adhere to the general social norm, other things being equal. How does the agent know what the minimum level of effort should be? This minimum effort could be specified in an employment contract, in which case the social norm to which the agent would have an interest in following might be interpreted as "honor your contractual obligations." But this need not be the case. The minimum effort could be defined by a social norm to "provide an honest day's work for an honest day's pay." In either case, observe that the agent's intrinsic motivation is not focused directly on the principal's interests but rather on a more generalized norm of behavior.
Given equation (8), the agent's optimal effort choice is 2 r e + = δ .
Consistent with the findings above, effort under a fixed-wage contract with positive intrinsic motivation will always be greater than effort under an incentive contract when intrinsic motivation is absent when the innate sense of duty felt by the agent is large enough. Specifically, If the agent behaves as if feeling no sense of duty to follow the generalized social norm, then his utility is
which corresponds to an effort choice of 0 = e . If, however, the agent is intrinsically motivated, then the agent's utility is
which corresponds to effort choice 1 e . The agent will be intrinsically motivated when equation ). Hence, incentive compensation will not crowd out intrinsic motivation when the object of the agent's intrinsic motivation is a general social norm or contractual provision, rather than the interests of the principal. The reason is that because the agent's intrinsic motivation is not grounded in the direct interests of the principal, there is no potential conflict of interest between the agent's extrinsic interests and his intrinsic motivation to act in accordance with a generalized social norm. Consequently, there is no reason for extrinsic incentives to crowd out intrinsic motivation.
III. Conclusion
For some agents with a willingness to work in the absence of explicit incentives, the introduction of monetary incentives causes a discontinuous decline in their effort choices. This shift in effort occurs if the agent's innate sense of duty is directed toward a principal who also controls the extrinsic compensation of the agent. The erosion of duty in this case reflects a tradeoff the agent faces between intrinsic satisfaction derived from doing one's duty, even when the effort required is personally costly, and extrinsic satisfaction derived from being compensated. When the object of the agent's intrinsic motivation is on more generalized norms of behavior, explicit incentives would not crowd out the intrinsic motivation of agents.
This analysis suggests that a consideration of what an agent is intrinsically motivated to do is just as important as the choice of optimal incentive contracts within a principal-agent framework. For example, indoctrinating workers on the importance of acting in the firm owners'
interests when incentives are also used to help align the interests of owner and worker may be counterproductive. The reason is that workers may "see through" attempts by firm owners to them to maximize profits as enriching the owners at the expense of the firm. According to Miller (2001) , "Holmstrom's impossibility result has supplied an alternative vision of opportunismopportunism on the part of owners themselves. It is an opportunism that follows from their ownership of residual profits, and it paradoxically puts them at odds with overall efficiency of the firm" (p. 329). The idea is that under certain circumstances firm owners could increase their residual returns by fostering inefficiencies within the organization. If workers expect this, they may be less inclined to "trust" firm owners who claim that certain activities or programs are for the good of the firm, resulting in lower returns for the firm owners. This might explain why Fehr and Gächter (2000a) found in their experiments that principals often preferred the less effective incentive contracts because they allowed the principals to appropriate a larger share of the surpluses produced from the principal-agent relationship, even though the surpluses were, in total, smaller than those produced from fixed-wage contracts. Principals who stress the importance of a healthy work ethics rather than inherent owner interests, on the other hand, may see such efforts as complementing their compensation programs for the good of the firm, consistent with Murdock's (2002) analysis that intrinsic motivation and incentive contracts are complementary. The reason is that workers may perceive these actions as credible efforts by firm owners to improve organization efficiency, thus encouraging agents to be intrinsically motivated for the good of the firm. 
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